# **Regional Analysis of Youth Demographics**

# RWANDA

### Key messages<sup>1</sup>

- Rwanda's rapid population growth is a consequence of high and slowly declining fertility rate amidst steadily declining death rates. The population is projected to increase from 11.6 million in 2015 to 25.3 million in 2065. Over the same period, youth 15-24 years will increase from 2.2million to 3.9 million.
- This population increase has implications on the demand for basic services such as schooling, housing and healthcare will increase significantly by 2065. For instance, demand for secondary school places could increase from an estimated 1.5 million in 2015 to 2.3 million by 2050.

# Context

The rapid rate at which Rwanda's population is growing and the consequent high child dependency burden are among the main challenges curtailing the country's socio-economic progress and attainment of Vision 2020. The Vision, seeks to fundamentally transform Rwanda into a middle income country by the year 2020, by achieving per capita income of US\$1,240 from US\$595 in 2011; a poverty rate of 20% from 44.9% in 2011; and an average life expectancy of 66 years from 49 years in 2000.<sup>2</sup> Some of the principles, which include: good governance, gender equality, science and technology including information and communications technology (ICT), and human resource development that drive the vision, mirror the pillars of the demographic dividend. This refers to the accelerated economic growth attained when populations have significantly more people in the working ages relative to the dependent population.<sup>3</sup> Departing from the UN definition of youth (15-24 years), the official age range for youth in Rwanda is 16-30 years, and these youth make up 29% of the population.<sup>4</sup> Rwanda has a youthful population with 40% under the age of 15. Thus its population agestructure has a wide base (Figure 1).

 The number of females age 15-34 in need of contraceptives could more than double from 823,000 in 2015 to 1.9 million by 2050.

 For Rwanda to benefit from its youthful population to reap a demographic dividend, it must intensify programmes to reduce child mortality, further lower fertility levels, invest in developing its human capital and equitably generate and distribute decent jobs to improve living standards.



Rwanda's population has more than doubled from 4.8 million people in 1978 to 10.5 million in 2012 and is projected to reach 16.3 million by 2032.<sup>5</sup> The population of youth is also expected to grow significantly. The UN Medium variant scenario predicts that there will be 3.9 million youth (15-24 years) in 2050, up from 2.2 million in 2015.<sup>6</sup> The youthful population is as a result of the relatively high fertility, which over a 20-year period, has reduced by only two children per woman to 4.2 in 2014.

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<sup>nepublic of Rwalda, Colizi, Rwalda visioli 2020. Revised 2012, Ngali, Rwalda.
<sup>3</sup>Bloom, D., David Canning, & Sevilla, J. (2003). The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change, by, RAND MR-1274-WFHF/DLPF/RF, 2002, 100 pp., ISBN: 0-8330-2926-6. Retrieved from Santa Monica, CA, USA.</sup>

<sup>4</sup>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, & Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. (2012b). Rwanda Fourth Population and Housing Census. Thematic Report: Population size, structure and distribution. Kigali, Rwanda. <sup>5</sup>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda & Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. (2012). Fourth Rwanda Population and Housing Census (RPHC4). Thematic Report: Population projections. Kigali, Rwanda. <sup>6</sup>United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. Custom data acquired from website

During the same period (1992-2014), under-five mortality declined from 151 deaths to 50 deaths per 1,000 live births, while infant mortality rate declined from 85 deaths to 32 deaths per 1,000 live births.<sup>7</sup> The high fertility rate is attributed to the early onset of childbearing and marriage, low status of women, low levels of female education, poor access to contraception especially among rural women and youth, and cultural norms that favour high fertility.8 Rwanda has a high dependency ratio of about 80 dependents (0 - 14 years and 65+ years) for every 100 people of working age (15-64 years).<sup>4</sup> The high dependency ratio poses an economic burden to the country since a large proportion of its resources are needed to supply schools, health services, and other children's services. Equally, households struggle to support large families, and the long-term effects are a poverty trap as households are unable to save - an important factor that enables investments and capital accumulation and provides an impetus to socio-economic growth.<sup>8</sup> Despite the challenges posed by the youthful population, there is a window of opportunity for Rwanda to accelerate its economic development, if the right investments to take advantage of the youth demographics, are made.

This briefing note summarises a review of literature and policies on regional youth demographics, and highlights implications from our scenario modelling of the short-term and medium-term projections of the youth population in Rwanda. Specifically, the briefing note highlights the demand for basic and social services in the short and medium term. From the literature review and participatory workshops in the EAC countries, we have identified major domains for youth development. These are: health (including access to sexual and reproductive health services); education and skills development including ICT; employment; as well as migration and urbanisation. We therefore focus on these domains, while acknowledging that there are other important domains in youth development that should be addressed. Finally, the briefing note also draws from the country's demographic dividend report (2017) in which AFIDEP provided technical leadership.8

### Rwanda's Youth Demographics and Prospects for Harnessing a Demographic Dividend

Eminent scholars have defined the "youth bulge" as a temporary demographic phenomenon which occurs when child mortality declines and fertility falls rapidly such that the previous cohort of births is larger than subsequent cohorts.<sup>9</sup> As the large cohorts of births move into the working ages (15-64 years), we get a bulge in the population age structure and an increase

in the ratio of working age population relative to young dependents. The majority of African populations have a youthful population as portrayed in Figure 1, characterised by an ever increasing cohort of new births. Such an agestructure, not to be confused with a youth bulge, has an unfavourable ratio of working-age population to dependents and countries are unlikely to benefit economically unless there is significant investment in programmes to reduce fertility. With the right policies and investments, a youth bulge can lead to a demographic dividend. Rwanda's fertility rate of 4.2 births per woman means that the country currently has a youthful population, not a youth bulge. The prospects of a youth bulge are small in the short term unless there is a significant decline in fertility over the next two to three decades and child mortality continues to fall sharply. The United Nations fertility projections show that the country will attain a fertility rate of 2.1 (the replacement level fertility) by 2065.

The government's commitment to addressing current and anticipated development challenges faced by the youth, has been demonstrated through the National Youth Policy (2015). The policy takes into consideration the Post-2015 global development agenda, envisages the decentralisation of youth structures while defining a clear mechanism of establishing a strong synergy between youth and ICT. According to the policy, the major challenges faced by the young people include poverty,



<sup>7</sup>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Ministry of Health, & ICF International. (2015). Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2014-15. Rockville, Maryland, USA: NISR, MOH, and ICF International. <sup>8</sup>National Institute for Statistics in Rwanda, UNFPA, AFIDEP. Unlocking Rwanda's potential to reap the demographic dividend Kigali, Rwanda; 2017 <sup>9</sup> Justin Ylfu Lin. (2012). Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in Developing Countries? http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/youth-bulge-a-demographic-dividend-or-ademographic-bomb-in-developing-countries unemployment and economic empowerment, low quality education and training, health issues as well as poor access and utilisation of ICT. Moving forward, in order to reap the benefits of a youthful population, Rwanda needs to make investments in young people's education and skills development so that its youth can "compete globally", as the youth policy aspires, and that youth become the engine for accelerated economic transformation.

Demographers use the inverse of the dependency ratio as a proxy for the support ratio (ratio of effective producers to consumers), in effect assuming that everyone between 15-64 years (or 20-64 years) is contributing to household income and the rest are consumers rather than producers. The rate of change of the support ratio has been used to show the timing when the window of opportunity for harnessing the demographic dividend opens and closes. While the rate of change of the theoretical support ratio is positive, the window of opportunity to reap the demographic dividend is open. However, once the rate of change of the support turns negative, the dividend becomes negative, implying that the demographic change acts as a brake on economic growth rather than an impetus for economic growth.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 2 shows that the window of opportunity for Rwanda and other countries in the EAC and sub-Saharan Africa is is open from **now** until 2100, when the ratio of effective producers relative to consumers will become unfavourable. It should be emphasised that this window of opportunity can close without a country reaping a sizeable demographic dividend if the youth do not have the skills for the labour market or the country is unable to create enough jobs for the population of workers.

### Health status and access to sexual and reproductive health services

Although life expectancy has increased between 1990 and the present, from 50.8 to 69.3 years for females, and 47.5 to 66 years for males<sup>4</sup>, many people in Rwanda still encounter poor health outcomes. In 2016, according to the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), lower respiratory infections were the leading causes of death among Rwandese people of different ages, followed by tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases and HIV/ AIDS.<sup>11</sup> Women tend to fair worse than men on disease burden associated with sexual and reproductive health while men fair worse on infectious diseases such as tuberculosis.<sup>7</sup> The HIV prevalence rate among the population aged 15 to 49 was at 3.6% for females and 2.2% for males. HIV prevalence among young girls age 15 to 24 at 1.3%, is twice as high as for their male counterparts that is at 0.6%.<sup>7</sup> Rwanda is facing an increasing disease burden from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) including cancers, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases, diabetes, and kidney diseases. In order to reduce the double burden of ill health from both communicable and non-communicable diseases that Rwanda's labour force endures, efforts should focus on strengthening the functionality of the health system, including addressing the health workforce shortage, improving health infrastructure and ensuring sustainable financing. Access to health services among the youth, particularly sexual and reproductive health (SRH) information and services is poor.

Although adolescent childbearing rates in Rwanda are better than for most countries in the region, it is a major concern that the teenage fertility rate has increased from 40 to 44 births per 1,000 girls age 15 - 19 while the proportion of women age 15-19 who had started child bearing increased from 6% to 7.3% between 2010 and 2015.<sup>7</sup> The National Youth Policy. although it touches on adolescents' sexual and reproductive health, does not specify strategic mechanisms for implementing universal and comprehensive SRHR for youth. However, there have been efforts through the Family Planning Policy, supporting the need to lobby for integration of youth concerns into budgetary provisions and implementation of sustainable FP funding mechanisms. In 2014/15, about 7% of all young women (15-24 years) had an unmet need for contraception (women with unmet need are those who are want to stop or delay childbearing but are not using any method of contraception) while among the sexually active unmarried women 15-24 years, three in five (61%) had unmet need for contraception. Early childbearing undermines girls' human capital development which leads to lower labour force and political participation rates. As such, girls are behind in the formal labour market and economic productivity, potentially slowing down the economic growth of the country. To accelerate progress on female youths' SRHR and fertility reduction, stakeholders should promote female education, female empowerment, and provision of high-quality and effective contraception services.

#### Education and skills development

Rwanda has made progress in increasing enrolment in primary schools with the net enrolment rates (NER) increasing from 73% in 2000 to almost universal at 97.7% in 2016.<sup>13</sup> This resulted from various policies such as introduction of free basic education since 2003, school infrastructure development, teacher recruitment, capitation grants, increased availability of teaching and learning materials, promotion of girls' education, and increased parent involvement. There has also been a significant increase in secondary school NER from 14% in 2008 to 28% in 2015. This change is more notable at lower secondary school. Secondary school enrolment rate is higher among females at 38% compared to 35% for their male counterparts. Rwanda is committed to ensuring gender parity at all levels of education, a goal which is most clearly laid out in its 2003 Constitution and the Vision 2020 development plan. In terms of access to education, Rwanda has been successful in closing the gender gap at primary and secondary education levels but not at tertiary education levels. Data shows that at secondary school level, girls constitute about 53% of those enrolled, while at tertiary level and vocational training centres males constitute 56% and 62% of those enrolled, respectively.<sup>14</sup> Among adults, 22.8% males have no education, compared with 27.9% of females. In general, participation at secondary school and tertiary level is low for both boys and girls, an implication that few proceed to levels where they acquire the necessary skills to achieve their full potential in life.

### Employment and job creation

The economy of Rwanda has benefitted from a steady average growth rate of 8% between 2001 and 2015, resulting in an increase in per capita GDP from \$211 to \$735.15 Out of 57% of the population who were classified as poor, more than 35% were young people.<sup>16</sup> Results of the 2016 Labour Force Survey indicate that the unemployment rate in Rwanda stood at 17.8%.<sup>17</sup> The rate was higher among the female labour force (21.0%) than the male labour force (15.2%). Young people (15-24 years) experience higher unemployment (23.0%) than adults, with young women having much higher unemployment rates compared to their male counterparts (26.0% and 20.4%, respectively).<sup>17</sup> The unemployment crises among young people is not only driven by inaccessible jobs, but also inequality and discrimination

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Oosthuizen MJ. Bonus or mirage? South Africa's demographic dividend. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing. 2015/04/01/ 2015;5(Supplement C):14-22.
<sup>11</sup>Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. (2017). University of Washington. http://www.healthdata.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Ministry of Education. (2015). Education Statistics Yearbook. Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda <sup>15</sup>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. (2017). GDP National Accounts. 2016. Rebased estimates of GDP: An Explanatory note. Kigali. Rwanda <sup>16</sup>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. (2016). Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Economic Activity. Thematic Report, Kigali, Rwanda <sup>17</sup>National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR). Labour Force Survey August 2017 report. Kigali, Rwanda;

Pwanda <sup>12</sup>According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) definition, women with unmet need are those who are fecund and sexually active but are not using any method of contraception, and report not wanting any more children or wanting to delay the next child. The concept of unmet need points to the gap between women's reproductive intentions and their contraceptive behaviour. <sup>13</sup>Ministry of Education, C3016, 2016 Education Statistics Yearbook. Ministry of Education, Republic of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Ministry of Education. (2016). 2016 Education Statistics Yearbook. Ministry of Education, Republic of Rwanda. Kigali, Rwanda

by age and gender. The majority of the youth do not have the required competencies to be absorbed in the labour market so that their ability to secure fulfilling jobs and productive work is often undermined.<sup>17</sup> The government's commitment towards addressing the challenge of unemployment among youth does not make critical linkages with expected changes in population. For example, the 2015 National Youth Policy mentions the current youth's unemployment; however, it does not link it with current and future fertility and the projected large populations of youths arising from the prevailing high fertility. Similarly, Rwanda's urbanisation policy, though commendable for highlighting that youth unemployment in urban areas is a key concern, does not state how youth unemployment will be tackled.

#### Migration and Urbanisation

The rapid increase in Africa's urban population has largely been driven by natural increase (i.e. the difference between births and deaths) within urban populations, which accounts for about 75% of the urban growth in Africa, with rural-tourban migration making up the rest. In contrast, natural increase accounts for only 50% of urban growth in Asia.<sup>18</sup> Urbanisation in Rwanda is characterised by demographic growth and migration to urban areas accompanied by the installation of displaced people and returnees after the 1994 genocide. The urban population increased from 4.6% in 1978 to 16.5% in 2012<sup>4</sup>, and to 29% in 2015, with an annual urban growth rate of 6.4%.<sup>19</sup> Although the contribution

of migration to urban growth is low in Africa compared to other developing regions, there is a distinct pattern of circular rural-urban migration in the continent characterised by significant back-and-forth mobility of young adults who navigate the perceived worsening rural economic conditions and the unpredictable labour market in urban settings in search of better livelihood opportunities.<sup>20</sup> However, data for quantifying this high volume of the internal mobility is generally not collected in many African countries. According to the UN migration profile for Rwanda, there was a crude net migration rate of close to zero in 2013, a significant reduction from 60% in the 1990s. This means that roughly, the same number of people are leaving as are coming in. Among those who emigrate, about 4-7% are youth in the ages of 15-30 years. In 2013, there were more than 67,000 male youths (15-30) and 72,200 female youth who migrated. The common destinations for young people are within the EAC, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Congo, followed by France. France (32%), followed by USA, South Africa, India (21%). and UK (5%) are the most popular destinations for postgraduate studies.<sup>21</sup>

### **Future Implications of** Youth Demographics in Rwanda

Fertility is the most influential determinant of population change in Rwanda. Policies and programmes to reduce the high fertility will have

implications for future youth demographics in decades to come. Furthermore, the desirable age-structure which is dominated by the working-age population can only be achieved with significant investments in family planning services. The large youthful population has created a population momentum, implying that the population will continue to grow for several decades even if the country were to achieve replacement fertility of 2.1 in the next 30-50 years. To assess the future demand for schools, family planning services, and jobs, we used the UN models to generate population projections for 2030, 2050, and 2065, starting from a baseline of 2015. The UN Medium variant scenario assumes that increases in contraceptive use will result in lower fertility in patterns similar to the experience of other countries that have gone through the demographic transition. The UN Low variant scenario, assumes that for most of the projection period, fertility is half a birth lower than the medium variant.

The UN model makes allowance for high mortality due to HIV/AIDS in high prevalence countries and migration in countries where there is significant movement of people.<sup>22</sup> We also analysed an Accelerated model, where we assumed that total fertility would decline rapidly to replacement level by 2065. The Accelerated scenario and Low variant model are almost identical in terms of the projected populations. Projected populations of youth are shown in Figure 3.



<sup>18</sup>Chen N, Valente P, Zlotnik H. (1998). What do we know about recent trends in urbanization? In: Bilsborro RE, ed. Migration, Urbanization, and Development: New Directions and Issues. Norwell, MA: UNFPA-Kluwer Academic; 1998: 59-88. <sup>19</sup>UN Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM Edition. In: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs PD, ed; 2014 <sup>20</sup>Deguy D, Bocquier P, Zulu E. (2010) Circular migration patterns and determinants in Nairobi slum Urbanization 2020 (2000) Circular migration patterns and determinants in Nairobi slum ents Demogr Res 2010: 23(20): 549-586

<sup>21</sup>UNICEF and United Nation Population Division, (2017). Rwanda - Migration profile. https://esa.un.org/ miggmgprofiles/indicators/files/Rwanda.pdf. Accessed on 9th October 2017.
<sup>22</sup>United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Methodology of the United Nations Population Estimates and Projections, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP242.

#### **Future Demand for school places**

The official primary school age range for Rwanda is 7-12 years, while the official secondary school age range is 13-18 years. Figure 4 shows that under the UN Medium variant population projections, the primary school-age population is expected to increase from an estimated 1.8 million children in 2015 to 2.1 million and 2.4 million children by 2030 and 2050 respectively, but will decline to 2.3 million by 2065. The numbers will increase under the Accelerated model from 1.8 million to 2.1 million and 2.2 million by 2030 and 2050 respectively. However, by 2065, as a result of faster fertility decline under this model, the number expected will have reduced to 2.1 million.

The secondary school-age population under the UN Medium variant projection is expected to increase from an estimated 1.5 million in 2015 to 2.1 million and 2.3 million by 2030 and 2050. Under this model, it is estimated that the secondary school-age population will still be at 2.3 million but declining in 2065. On the other hand, under the Accelerated model, it is expected that this segment of the population will increase to 2.1 million and 2.2 million by 2030 and 2050 respectively, and reduce back to 2.1 million by 2065 (Figure 5).

Though the differences between the two projections appear not to be very large, overall, the Accelerated model will lead to fewer children of school age. More important though is the fact that under both scenarios, Rwanda's school age population for both primary and secondary school will increase significantly with an expected difference in the number of primary school age children between 2015 and 2050 of at least 400,000 and a difference for the two time points of almost 700,000 for secondary school age teenagers under the Accelerated model.

The implications of the expected increases are that there is need to expand school infrastructure and teaching and management staff or to embrace innovation such as digital learning (that Rwanda is already doing to some extent) in order to accommodate the rising numbers of students expected in the schools. This is especially so for secondary schools where an estimated 37% of the population of secondary school-age were enrolled in secondary school in 2014 compared to 98% at primary school. While the near-universal net enrolment rate in primary school is commendable, if the secondary school net enrolment rates are to increase to the current average levels of Uppermiddle-income countries (79%), then Rwanda has to embark on serious efforts including the mobilisation of significant resources. Further, resources and planning must also be devoted towards ensuring higher transition rates to tertiary and vocational training institutions

#### Figure 4: Estimated number of primary shool age-population (age 7-12) (in thousands)







to avoid high dropout rates that can leave the country with a mass of unskilled youth. Youth without adequate skills are likely to be unemployed or underemployed and this can lead to disillusionment of the young people who can then become a destabilising force for the country instead of the ignition for the demographic dividend. Long-term planning must also take into account rationalisation of the use of the infrastructure being put in place as the projections under both models for instance show that the demand for both primary and secondary school places will be on the decline by 2065 as a result of the change in age structure that will reduce the cohorts of children born and become smaller over time.

### Youth population not in education, employment or training

The share of the young people who are not employed in Rwanda is significant and growing. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) points out that when young persons in this group of the "not in employment" are simultaneously "not in education or training" (NEET), then they are even more important to consider since they are neither improving their future employability through investments in skills nor gaining experience through employment. As a result, this group is particularly at risk of both labour market and social exclusion. The Rwanda 2016 Labour Force Survey (LFS) shows that unemployment in the 16-24 age group was 23%, and 15% for the 25-34 age group. Making the assumption that these unemployment rates remain constant

over the next forty years, we find that the absolute number of unemployed in the 16-34 age-group is expected to rise significantly (see Table 1). From a baseline of 310,000 in 2015, the numbers could rise to 416,000, 535,000 and 545,000 in 2030, 2050 and 2065 respectively under the Accelerated scenario. The number could rise as high as 579,000 by 2065 under the UN Medium variant scenario. Apart from these socially excluded young people being at a high risk of falling into the poverty trap, they are also a potential destabilising force that can cause civil disturbance and be a potential recruiting pool for radical forces (including rebel groups and terrorists). They also form a pool of desperate potential labour migrants.



Age Group	2015	2030		2050		2065	
	Baseline ((UN Medium Variant)	Accelerated	UN Medium Variant	Accelerated	UN Medium Variant	Accelerated	UN Medium Variant
16-24	123	181	182	206	209	199	219
25-34	187	235	235	329	322	346	360
16-34	310	416	417	535	532	545	579

#### Table 1: Estimated number of young people unemployed, Rwanda (in thousands)

### Demand for contraception among female youth

Using the medium variant population projections for 2020-2065, we estimated the future total demand for contraception among sexually active female youth (married and unmarried) in Rwanda. Total demand includes women using contraception and those who have an unmet need for contraception. For 2015, we used the 2014/15 Rwanda DHS distribution of the total demand for contraception. For the 2030 projections, when Rwanda's total fertility rate (TFR) will be about 3.2, we use the distribution of the demand for contraception based on the average for low and middle income countries that have a TFR of between 3.1-3.4; for 2050, when Rwanda's TFR is projected to be around 2.4, we use the distribution for countries with TFR of around 2.4- 2.6; and for 2065 we use the distribution for countries with TFR of 1.9-2.3 since Rwanda's TFR is projected to be about 2.1. The results are shown in Figure 6.

The Guttmacher Institute, in their 2014 Adding It Up publication estimate that in low income countries, the cost of providing adequate contraception per woman is around \$10, and that each dollar invested in contraception reduces the cost of meeting the healthcare as a result of unintended pregnancies, unsafe abortion, HIV in pregnancy care, and unplanned births by \$1.47. Assuming constant prices between 2014 and 2065, the cost and benefits of providing contraception to female youth are shown in Figure 7.

## Modelling the demographic dividend

The potential demographic dividend Rwanda could earn between 2015 and 2050 has been estimated using the DemDiv modelling tool.<sup>23,24</sup> Four policy scenarios were used: (i) **Business as Usual**, where slow progress in economic reforms, human capital development and decline in fertility rate persist till 2050; (ii) **Economic emphasis**, where the focus of investments is on improving economic competitiveness and productive efficiency without simultaneous focus on investing in education and family planning; (iii) Economic and Education emphasis, where investments are made to enhance both economic competitiveness and education levels but not on family planning; and Combined emphasis, where optimal investments are made in family planning in addition to economic competitiveness and education. In Rwanda, the level of economic growth that the Government envisages in Vision 2020 and initial discussions towards formulation of Vision 2050 will only be achieved under the Combined scenario, which would generate a GDP per capita of US\$ 4,015 by 2035 and US\$ 12,555 by 2050. The GDP per capita achieved under the Economic scenario will be below target, at US\$ 3,207 in 2035 and US\$ 9,098 by 2050. The demographic dividend, which is the additional GDP per capita that the country would earn by 2050 by investing in its human development, in addition to its investments in the economic sector, would amount to US \$ 3,457



Figure 8: Projected Per Capita GDP (in USD)

<sup>23</sup>Moreland, S., E. L. Madsen, B. Kuang, M. Hamilton, K. Jurczynska, & P. Brodish. (2014). Modeling the Demographic Dividend: Technical Guide to the DemDiv Model. Washington, DC. <sup>24</sup>National Institute for Statistics in Rwanda, UNFPA, AFIDEP. Unlocking Rwanda's potential to reap the demographic dividend Kigali, Rwanda; 2017. per capita (Figure 8). Greater investments in the economic sector under the **Combined Scenario** would push Rwanda to be among the highly developed countries in the world by 2050.

# What is the risk of "business as usual"?

The projected rapid growth of the youth population in Rwanda will place significant pressure on the country's economy given the need to educate, house, and provide healthcare for them. As the population grows in rural areas and land for growing food becomes scarce, there is likely to be increased migration from rural to urban areas in search of livelihoods. International migration is also likely to increase as young people seek livelihood opportunities in neighbouring countries and beyond. Estimates from the United Nations migration statistics suggest that roughly 2.5 million inhabitants from Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda emigrated in 2015 alone and about 35% were youth between 15-34 years. Men and women were equally likely to migrate. Finally, the inactivity in addressing youth demographics may threaten the country's security since unemployed, disenchanted youth can react by causing civil unrest.<sup>25, 26</sup>

### Recommendations

Rwanda can take advantage of the demographic dividend to accelerate its journey towards becoming a high-income country with good living standards for all. For this to happen, the government should invest in the following key recommendations:

### Government Response

• Accelerating fertility decline: Ensuring universal access to family planning, advocacy for reducing fertility levels, keeping girls in school and enhancing female education, and reinforcing efforts in reducing child mortality.

#### • Creating a healthy workforce:

Operationalise the health financing strategy to ensure sustainable funding of the health sector in lieu of declining external resources, paying particular attention to enhancing management and ensuring universal coverage of the Community-Based Health Insurance scheme and performance-based financing.

#### • Improving education and skills

development: Address the implementation hurdles in on-going efforts to improve the quality and relevance of basic education, and extend the universal education principle to early childhood education, upper secondary school, and technical training (TVET) while increasing access to tertiary levels of education and closing all gender gaps at post-secondary levels.

• Accelerating economic growth and creating quality jobs: Reinforce fiscal discipline and create a conducive and attractive business environment, which will be key to enhance productivity of businesses and purchasing power of the population.

• Strengthening governance, efficiency and accountability: Good governance and entrenching the culture of accountability in all spheres of development is vital in bridging the policy to implementation gap, ensuring value for money in service deliver, and providing a conducive business environment to attract direct foreign investment, which is critical to expand the private sector and overall capacity of the economy to create ample quality jobs for the youthful labour force.

 Promoting gender equity and empowerment by eradicating gender gaps in education, reproductive health services particularly improving access to production assets to women, particularly credit facilities, farm equipment, and business ownership.

### Recommendations for Development Partners

The recommendations entail specific efforts by development partners to provide strategic technical and financial support focusing on the following areas:

• Promote workplace readiness programmes including internship, mentorship and on-the-job training opportunities.

• Address gender related bottlenecks in skill development, economic resources, and the labour market that subject women to the informal sector with the aim of steadily shifting women to the formal sector and labour market.

iii. Strengthen campaigns/programmes for instance against gender based violence, especially in ensuring women understand and fight for their rights and the legal and security systems enforce existing laws aimed at protecting women.

• Programmers and planning officials should be equipped with the right expertise in system thinking that would help reinforce synergies across demographic dividend interventions as well as promoting skills in cost-benefit analysis of interventions.

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<sup>25</sup>Cramer, C. World Development Report (2011). Unemployment and Participation in Violence. London

26 Azeng, Therese F. and Yogo, Thierry U. (2013), Youth Unemployment And Political Instability In Selected Developing Countries, Working Paper Series N









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